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Continuation: The Chapter on Analogy

Al-Shafi'i distinguishes outward from inward knowledge through the qibla, uprightness, admission, evidence, and oaths, showing that legal duty follows the outward and that analogy yields preponderant probability.

Fiqh and Legal Theory2024-12-28

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All praise is due to Allah. I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, alone, without partner, and I bear witness that Muhammad is His servant and Messenger ﷺ.

Continuation of the chapter on analogy:

In this section Imam al-Shafi’i continues his discussion of analogy (qiyas). He focuses on the degrees of knowledge and the indication of the proofs, and on the difference between knowledge of the outward and of the inward, and he gives applied examples of this from the issues of the qibla (direction of prayer), uprightness, Islam, admission, evidence, and the oath. He shows that legal responsibility (taklif) is according to the outward, and that the indication of analogy is preponderantly probable, not definitive like the texts.

The main points Imam al-Shafi’i addressed in this section:

  • The difference between knowledge of the outward and of the inward: Imam al-Shafi’i explains that knowledge is of two kinds: comprehensive knowledge, outwardly and inwardly, which is definitive, certain knowledge, like explicit texts; and knowledge of the truth outwardly but not inwardly, which is preponderantly probable knowledge, like the solitary report and analogy. He stresses that legal responsibility is according to the outward, and that the indication of analogy is probable, not definitive.
  • Examples of the difference between knowledge of the outward and of the inward: Imam al-Shafi’i gives examples to clarify the difference between knowledge of the outward and of the inward:
    • Facing the Ka’ba: Whoever sees the Ka’ba directly has comprehensive knowledge, outwardly and inwardly; as for whoever does not see it, it suffices him to face its direction, and this is knowledge of the outward but not the inward.
    • Uprightness and Islam: People are charged with dealing with others on the basis of their outward state of uprightness (‘adala) and Islam, while it is possible that the inward is otherwise. Whoever pronounces the two testimonies of faith is judged a Muslim outwardly, and it is permissible to intermarry with him and for inheritance to pass between him and others, even though he may be a hypocrite inwardly. Likewise, the witness’s outward state is accepted so long as the contrary does not become apparent, even though he may be inwardly a sinner (fasiq).
    • Admission, evidence, and the oath: Imam al-Shafi’i explains that admission (iqrar) is the strongest of the proofs, then evidence (bayyina), then the oath (yamin); that the ruling may differ according to which of these proofs is present; that the indication of each of them varies; and that the ruling is according to the outward that is available.
  • The variation in the indication of the proofs: Imam al-Shafi’i stresses the variation in the indication of the proofs: the indication of a text is stronger than the indication of analogy, and the indication of analogy also varies. Some of it is in the meaning of the original case, which is stronger, and some of it is by resemblance, which is weaker. He explains that legal responsibility is according to what has become apparent of the truth, and that the mujtahid is charged with what his ijtihad has led him to.
  • Response to those who give judgement on refusal alone: Imam al-Shafi’i responds to those who judge a right to be established merely by the defendant’s refusal (nukul) to take the oath, and explains that what is closer to correct is to turn the oath back to the claimant; if he swears, his right is established for him.
  • The obligation to act on what ijtihad has led to: Imam al-Shafi’i stresses the obligation to act on what the mujtahid’s ijtihad has led him to, rather than tracking the statements of the scholars in order to pick out from them what agrees with one’s desires. He censures whoever does that, and explains that the role of the mufti is to perform ijtihad or to ask the mujtahids.
  • Arguing from verses that knowledge is from Allah: Imam al-Shafi’i cites some verses showing that knowledge is from Allah, that people are bound in worship by what they have been commanded, that when they do not know something they stop at it, and that they did not give themselves anything; rather, it is the gift of Allah.

Applied examples:

  • The qibla: Whoever sees the Ka’ba directly is obliged to face the Ka’ba itself, and this is comprehensive knowledge, outwardly and inwardly. As for whoever does not see it, it suffices him to face its direction, and this is knowledge of the outward but not the inward.
  • Testimony: The testimony of an upright person is accepted outwardly, even though he may be inwardly a sinner.
  • Admission: A person’s admission against himself is the strongest of the proofs, even though he may be forgetful or mistaken.
  • The oath: The oath is turned back to the claimant when the defendant refuses it; it is a weaker indication than evidence and admission, but it is acted upon when needed.
  • Zakat on rice: Rice is drawn by analogy to wheat in the obligation of zakat because of a shared effective cause, namely that both are foodstuffs that are stored; but this is a probable indication, not a definitive one.

Additional clarifications:

  • Al-nukul: Refusing to take the oath.
  • Al-qibla: The direction the Muslims face in their prayer, which is the direction of the Honoured Ka’ba.
  • Al-‘adala: Uprightness in religion and in personal honour (muru’a).
  • Al-iqrar: A person’s acknowledgement of a right owed by him to another.
  • Al-bayyina: Conclusive proof of a right.

Final summary:

In this section Imam al-Shafi’i explains the degrees of knowledge and the indication of the proofs, and the difference between knowledge of the outward and of the inward. He stresses that legal responsibility is according to the outward, that the indication of analogy is preponderantly probable rather than definitive, that the mujtahid is charged with what his ijtihad has led him to, and that tracking the statements of the scholars to pick out from them what agrees with one’s desires is blameworthy. He explains that the proofs vary in strength, that the ruling may differ according to them, and that action is according to what has become apparent of the truth.

All parts of Summary of the Explanation of al-Shafi'i's al-Risala by Dr. Yasir Burhami